I was reading The Man Who Created the Middle East by Christopher Simon Sykes—a fascinating account of Mark Sykes and the infamous Sykes-Picot Agreement—when the news broke that the Syrian government seemed to be teetering on the brink. It was almost surreal: the legacy of imperial lines drawn on maps a century ago now intersecting with the latest chapter of chaos and realignment in the Middle East.
The book chronicles how Sykes and François Georges-Picot, with British and French backing, divided the Ottoman Empire’s spoils, shaping the region we know today. Their work was designed with little concern for the people living there, and the effects—decades of unrest, war, and shifting alliances—are still unfolding. Watching the Syrian government falter in the face of mounting pressure this week, it felt as though I was seeing the aftershocks of that agreement play out in real-time. The boundaries and ambitions they created are still driving the decisions of major players: the U.S., Israel, Turkey, Russia, Iran, and even groups like Al-Qaeda.
As the pieces shift once more, I couldn’t help but reflect on how deeply the world’s powers are still entangled in that century-old framework—competing for influence and territory in a region built on lines that never made sense in the first place.
I mean my dudes, but literally the guy that is the new head of Syria al-Jolani was in al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda in Iraq, Mujahideen Shura Council, Islamic State of Iraq, and the al-Nusra Front. Who are you kidding?
Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, the leader of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), indeed has a long history tied to jihadist groups like al-Qaeda, the Mujahideen Shura Council, and the Islamic State of Iraq (the precursor to ISIS). Despite this, his transformation into the ostensible head of a “moderate” rebel faction is a stark illustration of how fluid alliances and narratives have become in Syria’s fragmented war.
This repackaging of al-Jolani and HTS as pragmatic actors or lesser evils is part of a broader strategy by international powers to justify continued involvement in the conflict. The United States and other backers of opposition forces understand al-Jolani’s past but may calculate that his current role in governing parts of northwest Syria, coupled with his declared break from al-Qaeda, makes him a more palatable partner than Iran-backed militias or the Assad regime. However, this whitewashing raises serious questions about the long-term viability of relying on figures with such deep extremist roots to establish stability or counter Russia and Iran’s influence. It also underscores the hypocrisy inherent in Western policy, which has oscillated between counterterrorism and using former jihadists as proxies for geopolitical ends.
It’s hard to overstate just how problematic this turn of events is for the United States. By backing opposition forces that include extremist factions, Washington has effectively inherited responsibility for a situation that is not only chaotic but also morally and politically indefensible. Whether or not the intention was to “own” Syria’s fractured future, that’s exactly what has happened. The Assad regime, for all its brutality, is no longer the sole face of Syria’s failure—now, that accountability is shared with the U.S. and its allies.
What makes this particularly troubling is the financial and reputational cost. Supporting opposition forces with links to groups like Al-Qaeda, even indirectly, risks immense backlash. The optics alone are terrible: funneling billions of dollars into a region where these factions operate invites questions about where the money will end up and how it will be used. Beyond that, the practical challenges of stabilizing these areas—governance, reconstruction, and security—are monumental. The U.S. is now on the hook for creating the appearance of stability, while any failures will be laid squarely at its feet. This isn’t just a strategic misstep; it’s a moral and political quagmire.
We own it
Imagine now going to the arab league and so like uh hey we need 10 billion dollars to starters just to give to uh an ex-al-qaeda dude so he can rebuild uh syria as a democratic uh place lol.
It’s almost impossible to imagine that conversation going well. Picture the U.S. or any Western representative approaching the Arab League and pitching this: “Hey, we need billions of dollars to support rebuilding Syria, and, oh by the way, the guy running the show now is an ex-Al-Qaeda operative. But don’t worry—he’s totally committed to democracy this time.” The absurdity of such a scenario borders on dark comedy, but it’s not far from the reality of what’s unfolding.
The problem isn’t just the optics; it’s the credibility deficit. Many in the region already view Western interventions as hypocritical and destabilizing, and this only deepens that narrative. Asking for financial backing or political support in these circumstances risks ridicule or outright refusal. Even allies who might sympathize with containing Iranian or Russian influence will balk at the idea of funding a project that puts them in bed with figures tied to extremist groups. The whole situation undermines the moral authority and strategic coherence of the U.S. position, turning what might have been a chess move against adversaries into a public relations nightmare.
Russian Defeat
It’s possible for Russia and Iran to experience a symbolic defeat while simultaneously navigating toward a relatively favorable outcome. On the surface, the fall of Assad-held positions or the perception of waning influence in Syria is undeniably a blow to their prestige. It diminishes their image as stable, long-term powerbrokers and exposes vulnerabilities in their ability to maintain control over an ally they’ve spent years propping up. This is particularly embarrassing for Russia, which has portrayed itself as a regional guarantor of order, and for Iran, whose ideological and strategic investments in Syria are tied to its broader regional ambitions.
However, this “black eye” might also conceal a strategic recalibration. In many ways, the shifting balance of power in Syria could offer Moscow and Tehran the “least worst” scenario. By allowing the West, Turkey, and other players to assume greater responsibility for Syria’s governance and stability, Russia and Iran can step back from the costly business of maintaining Assad’s grip on power. The immense burden of reconstruction, internal disputes among rebel groups, and the inevitable fallout from governing a deeply fractured state will now fall on their rivals.
Thus, while this may appear to be a short-term loss for Russia and Iran, it could ultimately relieve them of a long-term liability, enabling them to refocus their resources and potentially exploit the chaos that follows. In this sense, a “black eye” doesn’t preclude the possibility of quietly achieving the least damaging outcome in a deeply challenging situation.
Assad’s reputation for ruthlessness lends itself to a calculated pragmatism that might involve sacrificing key areas like Damascus and Homs if it serves a broader, longer-term strategy. For a leader whose primary goal is survival, abandoning parts of the country to opposition forces—even groups as extreme as Al-Qaeda-linked factions—might not be as unthinkable as it seems. If the outcome shifts the burden of governance and international scrutiny onto his adversaries, it could be a price he is willing to pay.
In this sense, Assad might view these losses not as defeats, but as tactical retreats. By allowing his enemies to take on the immense challenges of governing fractured territories, he and his backers can consolidate power in more defensible regions while waiting for the inevitable dysfunction of rival factions to unfold. For someone like Assad, whose regime has endured against tremendous odds, such a gamble might seem entirely rational, even if it involves temporary concessions that others would find unacceptable.
With the increasing prominence of opposition forces backed by the West, Turkey, and possibly Israel, responsibility for Syria’s future now rests on different shoulders. These groups, supported by U.S. and Turkish interests, are being positioned as the key players over large swathes of Syrian territory. As a result, the West and its allies have assumed control over a fractured state—one marked by weak governance, internal discord, and competing agendas.
When the situation inevitably deteriorates further—whether through renewed conflict, deepening economic troubles, or worsening humanitarian conditions—it will no longer be Assad and his backers who shoulder the blame. Instead, the West, Erdogan, and Israel will face scrutiny for the failures of their aligned factions. In a single strategic turn, Russia and Iran have effectively shifted Syria’s immense burdens onto their rivals, potentially turning a longstanding liability into a strategic advantage.
Analysis: U.S., Russian, and Iranian Strategic Approaches in Syria
The conflict in Syria represents a complex interplay of regional and global powers employing divergent strategies to achieve their long-term objectives. This analysis examines the respective strategies of the United States, Russia, and Iran, with a focus on their interplay and potential outcomes.
U.S. Strategy: Managed Chaos and Fragmentation
The United States has pursued a policy in Syria that prioritizes destabilizing adversaries over fostering governance in areas outside its control. While the U.S. officially supports moderate opposition forces and humanitarian goals, its actions often align with a broader objective of ensuring that neither Russia nor Iran can fully consolidate control over Syria. This strategy reflects two key principles:
1. Prevention of Adversarial Gains: The U.S. appears to accept instability as a better alternative than allowing Syria to fall entirely under Russian or Iranian influence. By supporting fragmented opposition groups, including some with extremist elements, the U.S. indirectly sustains a state of chaos that prevents the formation of a unified, adversary-aligned state.
2. Containment over Resolution: The U.S. has demonstrated limited appetite for direct involvement in rebuilding or stabilizing Syria, preferring to focus on containment of threats such as ISIS and mitigating regional spillover effects. This reflects a broader trend in U.S. foreign policy of avoiding protracted nation-building efforts.
However, this approach risks significant blowback:
• Extremist Empowerment: Supporting groups with extremist tendencies undermines long-term stability and complicates governance efforts post-conflict.
• Adversary Adaptation: Prolonged chaos may not indefinitely disadvantage adversaries like Russia and Iran, who have shown a capacity for long-term engagement in Syria.
Russian and Iranian Strategy: Strategic Patience and Controlled Reentry
The fall of Syrian government positions or the fragmentation of Assad’s authority in parts of Syria would constitute a significant setback for Russia and Iran, both of whom have invested substantial resources, political capital, and manpower to preserve their strategic foothold in the region. For Russia, Syria represents more than just an ally; it is a critical node in its ambition to project influence in the Middle East, maintain access to the Mediterranean via the Tartus naval base, and assert itself as a counterweight to U.S. hegemony. A loss of territory to U.S.-backed forces, Turkish influence, or opposition groups would diminish Moscow’s leverage in the region and undermine its carefully cultivated image as a guarantor of order and stability.
For Iran, the repercussions could be equally severe. Syria is a linchpin in the “axis of resistance,” serving as a key transit hub for weapons and support to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Any loss of control over critical supply routes or the establishment of zones hostile to Iranian influence would weaken Tehran’s regional strategy. Furthermore, Iran has deeply entrenched itself in Syria through militias, economic projects, and ideological outreach, all of which depend on a stable Assad regime to flourish. A crumbling Syrian government would not only jeopardize these investments but also embolden rivals like Israel and Saudi Arabia, who seek to curtail Iranian expansionism. In this context, the erosion of Assad’s authority is more than a tactical loss—it is a strategic blow to the long-term ambitions of both Moscow and Tehran in the Middle East.
That being said, Russia and Iran, Assad’s primary backers, have pursued a contrasting strategy characterized by patience and the calculated use of limited resources. Both powers recognize the inherent difficulties of immediate governance in a fractured Syria and appear willing to allow opposition groups to overextend themselves. Their approach is informed by historical and strategic lessons:
1. The “Let the Cows Reign” Strategy: Drawing from Ottoman practices, this strategy involves allowing temporary chaos to reign, knowing that non-state actors or fragmented opposition groups lack the capacity for sustainable governance. Over time, this chaos erodes local support for opposition factions, creating an opening for Assad’s regime to reassert itself as the only viable authority.
2. Preserving Key Interests: Russia and Iran have focused their efforts on defending core strategic assets, such as:
• Russia: Securing its naval base at Tartus and maintaining influence in the Eastern Mediterranean.
• Iran: Establishing a land corridor to Hezbollah in Lebanon and bolstering its regional deterrence posture against Israel.
3. Long-Term Resource Allocation: Both powers have demonstrated a willingness to accept short-term setbacks or partial losses, viewing Syria as part of a broader regional strategy. Their actions suggest confidence that they can outlast U.S. engagement, which is often constrained by shifting political priorities and public opinion.
However, this approach is not without vulnerabilities:
• Resource Strain: Sustained involvement in Syria imposes economic and political costs on both Russia and Iran, particularly under the pressure of sanctions and regional opposition.
• International Isolation: Their support for Assad risks alienating potential allies and reinforcing their image as destabilizing actors in the international arena.
Potential Outcomes and Implications
1. U.S. Objectives: Short-Term Gains, Long-Term Risks
The U.S. strategy of managed chaos may successfully prevent Syria from becoming a fully consolidated Russian-Iranian sphere of influence. However, the lack of a clear plan for post-conflict governance risks creating enduring instability, which could:
• Provide safe havens for extremist groups.
• Lead to ungoverned spaces that destabilize neighboring states (e.g., Jordan, Iraq).
• Undermine U.S. credibility as a stabilizing force in the region.
2. Russian and Iranian Objectives: Calculated Risks
Russia and Iran’s approach is more cohesive and long-term, but it depends on their ability to manage significant challenges:
• Rebuilding Syria’s infrastructure and governance will require substantial investment and international cooperation, which may be difficult to secure under current geopolitical tensions.
• Their strategy relies on the assumption that local populations will eventually view Assad as a preferable alternative to ongoing chaos, a gamble that could backfire if the regime fails to deliver security and economic recovery.
3. Regional Dynamics
Other regional actors, including Turkey and Gulf states, play a critical role in shaping outcomes. Turkey’s focus on curbing Kurdish autonomy and the Gulf’s opposition to Iranian influence add layers of complexity to the conflict. These actors may exploit U.S., Russian, or Iranian missteps to advance their own agendas, further complicating resolution efforts.
Conclusion
Syria remains a critical theater for geopolitical competition, where the U.S., Russia, and Iran pursue divergent strategies shaped by their respective strengths, limitations, and long-term goals. While the U.S. prioritizes instability as a containment mechanism, Russia and Iran bet on strategic patience and eventual consolidation. The effectiveness of these approaches will depend on their ability to navigate the enduring complexities of the Syrian conflict, manage resource constraints, and adapt to shifting regional dynamics.
In the end, Syria’s future may hinge less on external actors and more on the resilience and will of its people, who bear the brunt of the ongoing conflict. How these powers balance their ambitions with the realities on the ground will determine whether Syria remains a battleground of competing interests or moves toward a semblance of stability.
Expanded Analysis: The Role of Turkey, the Kurds, and Israel in the Syrian Conflict
In addition to the United States, Russia, and Iran, regional actors such as Turkey, the Kurds, and Israel play pivotal roles in shaping the dynamics of the Syrian conflict. Their objectives and actions interact with those of the global powers, often amplifying or counteracting their strategies. This expanded analysis examines each actor’s role, objectives, and implications.
Turkey’s Strategy: Balancing Security and Regional Influence
Objectives
Turkey’s primary goals in Syria are shaped by security concerns, regional ambitions, and domestic political considerations:
1. Curbing Kurdish Autonomy: Turkey views Kurdish-led groups, particularly the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and its backbone, the YPG (People’s Protection Units), as extensions of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party), a designated terrorist organization. Preventing the establishment of an autonomous Kurdish region along its southern border is Ankara’s top priority.
2. Projecting Regional Power: Turkey seeks to establish itself as a dominant regional player, using its military presence in northern Syria to secure influence over the future of the country.
3. Containing Refugee Flows: With over 3.6 million Syrian refugees already in Turkey, Ankara aims to create a buffer zone in northern Syria to facilitate refugee resettlement and reduce domestic pressures.
Actions
Turkey has conducted multiple military operations in northern Syria, including:
• Operation Euphrates Shield (2016-2017): Targeted ISIS and Kurdish forces.
• Operation Olive Branch (2018): Captured Afrin from Kurdish control.
• Operation Peace Spring (2019): Aimed to establish a “safe zone” by pushing Kurdish forces away from the border.
Implications
• Turkey’s actions have complicated U.S. policy, as the U.S. relies on the SDF to combat ISIS but faces friction with Ankara over its support for Kurdish forces.
• Turkish military operations have destabilized northern Syria, exacerbating humanitarian crises and creating opportunities for extremist groups to resurface.
• Ankara’s alignment with Russia in certain areas (e.g., joint patrols in Idlib) contrasts with its broader opposition to Assad, showcasing its complex positioning in the conflict.
The Kurds: Caught Between Allies and Adversaries
Objectives
The Kurds, particularly through the SDF and YPG, aim to:
1. Establish Autonomy: The Kurds seek to preserve and expand the self-administration they established in northeastern Syria (Rojava) during the conflict.
2. Secure Western Support: They rely heavily on U.S. military and financial support to maintain their fight against ISIS and defend their autonomy from Turkey and Assad.
Challenges
The Kurds face significant obstacles:
• Pressure from Turkey: Turkish military offensives have repeatedly disrupted Kurdish control and displaced populations.
• Dependence on U.S. Support: The Kurds have experienced abrupt shifts in U.S. policy, such as the partial withdrawal of U.S. forces in 2019, leaving them vulnerable to Turkish attacks.
• Negotiations with Assad: Facing existential threats, the Kurds have occasionally engaged in talks with the Assad regime, seeking guarantees for their autonomy in exchange for aligning against Turkey.
Implications
The Kurds are pivotal to the fight against ISIS and play a crucial role in stabilizing northeastern Syria. However:
• Their continued autonomy is unlikely to be tolerated by Turkey, Assad, or even Iran, making their position precarious.
• U.S. wavering on Kurdish support has undermined trust and could push the Kurds toward unfavorable compromises with Assad or Russia.
Israel’s Strategy: Containing Iranian Influence
Objectives
Israel’s involvement in Syria is driven by its overarching security concerns, particularly regarding Iran:
1. Preventing Iranian Entrenchment: Israel seeks to prevent Iran and its proxy, Hezbollah, from establishing a permanent military presence in Syria, which could threaten Israeli territory.
2. Maintaining Strategic Deterrence: Through airstrikes and covert operations, Israel aims to signal its readiness to act against perceived threats.
Actions
• Airstrikes: Israel has conducted hundreds of airstrikes targeting Iranian weapons transfers, military infrastructure, and Hezbollah operatives in Syria.
• Diplomatic Engagement: While officially neutral in the conflict, Israel has maintained communication with Russia to deconflict operations and limit Russian interference in Israeli strikes.
Implications
• Israel’s actions have heightened tensions with Iran and its allies, risking broader regional escalation.
• Israeli strikes complicate Russia’s balancing act in Syria, as Moscow seeks to maintain good relations with both Israel and Iran.
• While Israel avoids direct involvement in the civil war, its operations underscore the broader regional stakes of the conflict.
Interplay of Regional Actors
The actions and objectives of Turkey, the Kurds, and Israel interact in ways that shape the broader conflict:
• Turkey vs. the Kurds: Turkey’s military campaigns directly undermine Kurdish stability, complicating U.S. efforts to use the SDF as a reliable partner against ISIS.
• Turkey and Israel: While both oppose Iranian influence, their strategies are largely independent, with Israel focused on airstrikes and Turkey prioritizing ground operations against the Kurds.
• Kurds and Assad: The Kurds’ negotiations with Assad reflect a pragmatic effort to secure autonomy, but such agreements could embolden the regime and its Iranian allies, complicating Israeli objectives.
Conclusion
The Syrian conflict is shaped by overlapping and competing strategies:
• Turkey seeks to neutralize Kurdish aspirations, secure its borders, and expand its regional influence.
• The Kurds aim to preserve autonomy while navigating shifting alliances with the U.S. and Assad.
• Israel focuses on countering Iran’s presence and safeguarding its security through surgical strikes and deterrence.
These actors operate within the broader framework of U.S., Russian, and Iranian strategies, amplifying the complexity of the conflict. Their interactions suggest that Syria’s future will not be determined solely by global powers but by the interplay of regional dynamics, which continue to evolve unpredictably.
Roll reverse
If the U.S. is indeed shifting toward a position where it must project the image of “building something” in Syria, this represents a strategic pivot with significant implications. Here’s how this might play out and what role Russia and Iran could take in response, possibly resembling insurgency tactics:
1. The U.S. as the “Reluctant Builder”
Even if the U.S. prefers controlled chaos in Syria, it may now feel compelled to project a veneer of governance, stability, or progress in regions it influences. This could include:
• Building Kurdish Autonomy:
Continuing to support the SDF and fostering a semi-autonomous Kurdish region in northeastern Syria, akin to Iraqi Kurdistan, as a counterweight to Assad and Turkey.
• Challenges: Alienates Turkey and requires managing Kurdish-Arab tensions.
• Rebel Stabilization Zones:
Supporting opposition-held areas, such as Idlib, with token aid and governance frameworks to portray these regions as viable alternatives to Assad’s rule.
• Challenges: Risk of Islamist groups dominating and undermining credibility.
• Countering Iranian Influence:
Presenting U.S. military presence and partnerships as a bulwark against Iran’s “malign influence” to justify long-term involvement.
This shift would force the U.S. to engage in symbolic infrastructure projects, governance initiatives, or economic aid to avoid accusations of perpetuating endless destruction.
2. Russia and Iran: The New “Insurgents”?
If the U.S. becomes the de facto stabilizer in parts of Syria, Russia and Iran may adopt asymmetric strategies to undermine American efforts, including tactics traditionally associated with insurgencies:
• Sabotage and Proxy Attacks:
Russia and Iran could use militias, proxies, or even disinformation campaigns to disrupt American-backed governance in Kurdish and rebel-held areas.
• Example: Iranian-backed groups might target U.S. forces or allies with IEDs or rocket attacks, similar to past tactics in Iraq.
• Russian Role: Russia could quietly encourage instability in SDF areas to weaken U.S.-Kurdish relations.
• Weaponizing Refugees and Humanitarian Crises:
By exacerbating conditions in U.S.-influenced zones (e.g., through airstrikes, withholding aid, or population displacement), Russia and Iran could create humanitarian crises that damage U.S. credibility.
• Economic Undermining:
Iran, with its network of loyalists and smuggling routes, could destabilize U.S.-backed regions by flooding them with cheap goods, narcotics, or by disrupting local economies.
• Diplomatic Isolation:
Russia could lead diplomatic efforts to paint U.S. actions as illegitimate occupation while positioning Assad’s regime as the lawful government. Iran would amplify this narrative through its regional alliances.
3. The Risk of American Overreach
Should the U.S. overplay its hand in “building stability,” it risks falling into a quagmire:
• Fragmentation of Alliances:
Turkey would resist any Kurdish autonomy, potentially forcing the U.S. to mediate between two partners with irreconcilable goals. Meanwhile, Islamist groups within the opposition could turn against U.S. efforts at “secular governance.”
• Limited Resources:
American public and political appetite for long-term nation-building is low. The U.S. could find itself stretched too thin to effectively counter Russian and Iranian insurgent-style tactics.
4. Implications for Russia and Iran as “Insurgents”
If Russia and Iran embrace a subversive role, it would mark a shift in strategy but not necessarily a defeat. Their objectives would focus on denial rather than direct confrontation:
• For Russia:
• Preserving Assad’s regime as a geopolitical asset.
• Undermining U.S. legitimacy in Syria while maintaining a foothold in the Mediterranean via Tartus.
• For Iran:
• Ensuring supply routes to Hezbollah remain intact.
• Expanding influence in Shia communities and preparing for long-term resistance.
Both nations would aim to outlast the U.S., betting that American political will erodes faster than their own.
Conclusion: A Game of Shifting Roles
If the U.S. is compelled to “build” in Syria, it inadvertently invites asymmetric responses from Russia and Iran, turning them into insurgent-like actors. This dynamic could escalate into a drawn-out contest, with the U.S. striving to maintain an illusion of stability while its adversaries work to expose cracks in that facade.
The irony is profound: a century after Sykes-Picot, external powers are still drawing new lines and creating new roles for themselves in Syria’s endless theater of conflict. Whether Russia and Iran embrace the insurgent mantle or find alternative strategies, they are unlikely to concede Syria’s future to American interests. Instead, they will aim to exploit the very chaos the U.S. once preferred to manage.