The Sack-Pie Treaty of Mordor

I’ve been reading The Man Who Created the Middle East by Christopher Simon Sykes, a fascinating—and frankly bewildering—account of how a couple of diplomats, armed with little more than pencils, whiskey, and a vague sense of geography, managed to redraw an entire region. It’s the kind of history that feels so absurdly implausible that it might as well have been a work of satire.

My review of “The Man Who Created the Middle East” by Christopher Simon Sykes,

Somewhere in a smoky corner of The Green Dragon Inn, Frodo, Sam, Merry, and Pippin found themselves with the unenviable task of dividing up Mordor. Gandalf had vanished in a puff of “wizardry business,” leaving a note saying: “Take care of this, will you? Back in a fortnight. Don’t forget the furnaces.”

“Well, Mordor’s a right mess,” said Frodo, staring at the ash-streaked map. “Who’d want it anyway?”

“Humans might like it,” Sam offered. “Big, gloomy sorts, aren’t they? They’ll think it’s dramatic.”

“Humans?!” scoffed Merry, snatching the quill. “Mordor’s perfect for Dwarves. All those mines, all that lava. They love that sort of thing!”

“Hang on,” interrupted Pippin, dipping a sausage into gravy. “We Hobbits deserve a slice too! Imagine all the mushrooms we could grow in the ash!”

“Oh, for the love of lembas, let’s just split it up and be done!” Frodo sighed.

The Black Gate to the humans. “They’ll appreciate the drama,” Frodo said, drawing a shaky line. “It screams tragic backstory.”

“What about the furnaces?” asked Sam.

“Wizarding nonsense. Leave them out,” Frodo replied.

“Mount Doom to the Dwarves—they’ll love it,” Merry declared. “Molten lava—perfect for forges!”

“What about the Eye of Sauron?” Sam asked nervously.

“Bit of Windex,” Merry said confidently.

“The Plains of Gorgoroth? For us!” Pippin scribbled furiously. “Rich volcanic soil—we’ll farm!”

“And the roaming orcs?” Frodo asked.

“Scarecrows!” Pippin grinned.

“The Tower of Barad-dûr… Oh, Elves will love it!” Merry exclaimed. “Tall and moody—just like them!”

“But it’s full of wizard traps,” Sam pointed out.

“Good! Keep them humble,” Frodo muttered.

“The Furnaces to Nobody. “Let’s leave the cursed machinery unallocated,” Frodo said. “Gandalf can deal with it—or not. I don’t care.”

Syria

I was reading The Man Who Created the Middle East by Christopher Simon Sykes—a fascinating account of Mark Sykes and the infamous Sykes-Picot Agreement—when the news broke that the Syrian government seemed to be teetering on the brink. It was almost surreal: the legacy of imperial lines drawn on maps a century ago now intersecting with the latest chapter of chaos and realignment in the Middle East.

The book chronicles how Sykes and François Georges-Picot, with British and French backing, divided the Ottoman Empire’s spoils, shaping the region we know today. Their work was designed with little concern for the people living there, and the effects—decades of unrest, war, and shifting alliances—are still unfolding. Watching the Syrian government falter in the face of mounting pressure this week, it felt as though I was seeing the aftershocks of that agreement play out in real-time. The boundaries and ambitions they created are still driving the decisions of major players: the U.S., Israel, Turkey, Russia, Iran, and even groups like Al-Qaeda.

As the pieces shift once more, I couldn’t help but reflect on how deeply the world’s powers are still entangled in that century-old framework—competing for influence and territory in a region built on lines that never made sense in the first place.

I mean my dudes, but literally the guy that is the new head of Syria al-Jolani was in al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda in Iraq, Mujahideen Shura Council, Islamic State of Iraq, and the al-Nusra Front. Who are you kidding?

Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, the leader of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), indeed has a long history tied to jihadist groups like al-Qaeda, the Mujahideen Shura Council, and the Islamic State of Iraq (the precursor to ISIS). Despite this, his transformation into the ostensible head of a “moderate” rebel faction is a stark illustration of how fluid alliances and narratives have become in Syria’s fragmented war.

This repackaging of al-Jolani and HTS as pragmatic actors or lesser evils is part of a broader strategy by international powers to justify continued involvement in the conflict. The United States and other backers of opposition forces understand al-Jolani’s past but may calculate that his current role in governing parts of northwest Syria, coupled with his declared break from al-Qaeda, makes him a more palatable partner than Iran-backed militias or the Assad regime. However, this whitewashing raises serious questions about the long-term viability of relying on figures with such deep extremist roots to establish stability or counter Russia and Iran’s influence. It also underscores the hypocrisy inherent in Western policy, which has oscillated between counterterrorism and using former jihadists as proxies for geopolitical ends.

It’s hard to overstate just how problematic this turn of events is for the United States. By backing opposition forces that include extremist factions, Washington has effectively inherited responsibility for a situation that is not only chaotic but also morally and politically indefensible. Whether or not the intention was to “own” Syria’s fractured future, that’s exactly what has happened. The Assad regime, for all its brutality, is no longer the sole face of Syria’s failure—now, that accountability is shared with the U.S. and its allies.

What makes this particularly troubling is the financial and reputational cost. Supporting opposition forces with links to groups like Al-Qaeda, even indirectly, risks immense backlash. The optics alone are terrible: funneling billions of dollars into a region where these factions operate invites questions about where the money will end up and how it will be used. Beyond that, the practical challenges of stabilizing these areas—governance, reconstruction, and security—are monumental. The U.S. is now on the hook for creating the appearance of stability, while any failures will be laid squarely at its feet. This isn’t just a strategic misstep; it’s a moral and political quagmire.

We own it

 Imagine now going to the arab league and so like uh hey we need 10 billion dollars to starters just to give to uh an ex-al-qaeda dude so he can rebuild uh syria as a democratic uh place lol.

It’s almost impossible to imagine that conversation going well. Picture the U.S. or any Western representative approaching the Arab League and pitching this: “Hey, we need billions of dollars to support rebuilding Syria, and, oh by the way, the guy running the show now is an ex-Al-Qaeda operative. But don’t worry—he’s totally committed to democracy this time.” The absurdity of such a scenario borders on dark comedy, but it’s not far from the reality of what’s unfolding.

The problem isn’t just the optics; it’s the credibility deficit. Many in the region already view Western interventions as hypocritical and destabilizing, and this only deepens that narrative. Asking for financial backing or political support in these circumstances risks ridicule or outright refusal. Even allies who might sympathize with containing Iranian or Russian influence will balk at the idea of funding a project that puts them in bed with figures tied to extremist groups. The whole situation undermines the moral authority and strategic coherence of the U.S. position, turning what might have been a chess move against adversaries into a public relations nightmare.

Russian Defeat

It’s possible for Russia and Iran to experience a symbolic defeat while simultaneously navigating toward a relatively favorable outcome. On the surface, the fall of Assad-held positions or the perception of waning influence in Syria is undeniably a blow to their prestige. It diminishes their image as stable, long-term powerbrokers and exposes vulnerabilities in their ability to maintain control over an ally they’ve spent years propping up. This is particularly embarrassing for Russia, which has portrayed itself as a regional guarantor of order, and for Iran, whose ideological and strategic investments in Syria are tied to its broader regional ambitions.

However, this “black eye” might also conceal a strategic recalibration. In many ways, the shifting balance of power in Syria could offer Moscow and Tehran the “least worst” scenario. By allowing the West, Turkey, and other players to assume greater responsibility for Syria’s governance and stability, Russia and Iran can step back from the costly business of maintaining Assad’s grip on power. The immense burden of reconstruction, internal disputes among rebel groups, and the inevitable fallout from governing a deeply fractured state will now fall on their rivals.

Thus, while this may appear to be a short-term loss for Russia and Iran, it could ultimately relieve them of a long-term liability, enabling them to refocus their resources and potentially exploit the chaos that follows. In this sense, a “black eye” doesn’t preclude the possibility of quietly achieving the least damaging outcome in a deeply challenging situation.

Assad’s reputation for ruthlessness lends itself to a calculated pragmatism that might involve sacrificing key areas like Damascus and Homs if it serves a broader, longer-term strategy. For a leader whose primary goal is survival, abandoning parts of the country to opposition forces—even groups as extreme as Al-Qaeda-linked factions—might not be as unthinkable as it seems. If the outcome shifts the burden of governance and international scrutiny onto his adversaries, it could be a price he is willing to pay.

In this sense, Assad might view these losses not as defeats, but as tactical retreats. By allowing his enemies to take on the immense challenges of governing fractured territories, he and his backers can consolidate power in more defensible regions while waiting for the inevitable dysfunction of rival factions to unfold. For someone like Assad, whose regime has endured against tremendous odds, such a gamble might seem entirely rational, even if it involves temporary concessions that others would find unacceptable.

With the increasing prominence of opposition forces backed by the West, Turkey, and possibly Israel, responsibility for Syria’s future now rests on different shoulders. These groups, supported by U.S. and Turkish interests, are being positioned as the key players over large swathes of Syrian territory. As a result, the West and its allies have assumed control over a fractured state—one marked by weak governance, internal discord, and competing agendas.

When the situation inevitably deteriorates further—whether through renewed conflict, deepening economic troubles, or worsening humanitarian conditions—it will no longer be Assad and his backers who shoulder the blame. Instead, the West, Erdogan, and Israel will face scrutiny for the failures of their aligned factions. In a single strategic turn, Russia and Iran have effectively shifted Syria’s immense burdens onto their rivals, potentially turning a longstanding liability into a strategic advantage.

Analysis: U.S., Russian, and Iranian Strategic Approaches in Syria

The conflict in Syria represents a complex interplay of regional and global powers employing divergent strategies to achieve their long-term objectives. This analysis examines the respective strategies of the United States, Russia, and Iran, with a focus on their interplay and potential outcomes.

U.S. Strategy: Managed Chaos and Fragmentation

The United States has pursued a policy in Syria that prioritizes destabilizing adversaries over fostering governance in areas outside its control. While the U.S. officially supports moderate opposition forces and humanitarian goals, its actions often align with a broader objective of ensuring that neither Russia nor Iran can fully consolidate control over Syria. This strategy reflects two key principles:

1. Prevention of Adversarial Gains: The U.S. appears to accept instability as a better alternative than allowing Syria to fall entirely under Russian or Iranian influence. By supporting fragmented opposition groups, including some with extremist elements, the U.S. indirectly sustains a state of chaos that prevents the formation of a unified, adversary-aligned state.

2. Containment over Resolution: The U.S. has demonstrated limited appetite for direct involvement in rebuilding or stabilizing Syria, preferring to focus on containment of threats such as ISIS and mitigating regional spillover effects. This reflects a broader trend in U.S. foreign policy of avoiding protracted nation-building efforts.

However, this approach risks significant blowback:

• Extremist Empowerment: Supporting groups with extremist tendencies undermines long-term stability and complicates governance efforts post-conflict.

• Adversary Adaptation: Prolonged chaos may not indefinitely disadvantage adversaries like Russia and Iran, who have shown a capacity for long-term engagement in Syria.

Russian and Iranian Strategy: Strategic Patience and Controlled Reentry

The fall of Syrian government positions or the fragmentation of Assad’s authority in parts of Syria would constitute a significant setback for Russia and Iran, both of whom have invested substantial resources, political capital, and manpower to preserve their strategic foothold in the region. For Russia, Syria represents more than just an ally; it is a critical node in its ambition to project influence in the Middle East, maintain access to the Mediterranean via the Tartus naval base, and assert itself as a counterweight to U.S. hegemony. A loss of territory to U.S.-backed forces, Turkish influence, or opposition groups would diminish Moscow’s leverage in the region and undermine its carefully cultivated image as a guarantor of order and stability.

For Iran, the repercussions could be equally severe. Syria is a linchpin in the “axis of resistance,” serving as a key transit hub for weapons and support to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Any loss of control over critical supply routes or the establishment of zones hostile to Iranian influence would weaken Tehran’s regional strategy. Furthermore, Iran has deeply entrenched itself in Syria through militias, economic projects, and ideological outreach, all of which depend on a stable Assad regime to flourish. A crumbling Syrian government would not only jeopardize these investments but also embolden rivals like Israel and Saudi Arabia, who seek to curtail Iranian expansionism. In this context, the erosion of Assad’s authority is more than a tactical loss—it is a strategic blow to the long-term ambitions of both Moscow and Tehran in the Middle East.

That being said, Russia and Iran, Assad’s primary backers, have pursued a contrasting strategy characterized by patience and the calculated use of limited resources. Both powers recognize the inherent difficulties of immediate governance in a fractured Syria and appear willing to allow opposition groups to overextend themselves. Their approach is informed by historical and strategic lessons:

1. The “Let the Cows Reign” Strategy: Drawing from Ottoman practices, this strategy involves allowing temporary chaos to reign, knowing that non-state actors or fragmented opposition groups lack the capacity for sustainable governance. Over time, this chaos erodes local support for opposition factions, creating an opening for Assad’s regime to reassert itself as the only viable authority.

2. Preserving Key Interests: Russia and Iran have focused their efforts on defending core strategic assets, such as:

• Russia: Securing its naval base at Tartus and maintaining influence in the Eastern Mediterranean.

• Iran: Establishing a land corridor to Hezbollah in Lebanon and bolstering its regional deterrence posture against Israel.

3. Long-Term Resource Allocation: Both powers have demonstrated a willingness to accept short-term setbacks or partial losses, viewing Syria as part of a broader regional strategy. Their actions suggest confidence that they can outlast U.S. engagement, which is often constrained by shifting political priorities and public opinion.

However, this approach is not without vulnerabilities:

• Resource Strain: Sustained involvement in Syria imposes economic and political costs on both Russia and Iran, particularly under the pressure of sanctions and regional opposition.

• International Isolation: Their support for Assad risks alienating potential allies and reinforcing their image as destabilizing actors in the international arena.

Potential Outcomes and Implications

1. U.S. Objectives: Short-Term Gains, Long-Term Risks

The U.S. strategy of managed chaos may successfully prevent Syria from becoming a fully consolidated Russian-Iranian sphere of influence. However, the lack of a clear plan for post-conflict governance risks creating enduring instability, which could:

• Provide safe havens for extremist groups.

• Lead to ungoverned spaces that destabilize neighboring states (e.g., Jordan, Iraq).

• Undermine U.S. credibility as a stabilizing force in the region.

2. Russian and Iranian Objectives: Calculated Risks

Russia and Iran’s approach is more cohesive and long-term, but it depends on their ability to manage significant challenges:

• Rebuilding Syria’s infrastructure and governance will require substantial investment and international cooperation, which may be difficult to secure under current geopolitical tensions.

• Their strategy relies on the assumption that local populations will eventually view Assad as a preferable alternative to ongoing chaos, a gamble that could backfire if the regime fails to deliver security and economic recovery.

3. Regional Dynamics

Other regional actors, including Turkey and Gulf states, play a critical role in shaping outcomes. Turkey’s focus on curbing Kurdish autonomy and the Gulf’s opposition to Iranian influence add layers of complexity to the conflict. These actors may exploit U.S., Russian, or Iranian missteps to advance their own agendas, further complicating resolution efforts.

Conclusion

Syria remains a critical theater for geopolitical competition, where the U.S., Russia, and Iran pursue divergent strategies shaped by their respective strengths, limitations, and long-term goals. While the U.S. prioritizes instability as a containment mechanism, Russia and Iran bet on strategic patience and eventual consolidation. The effectiveness of these approaches will depend on their ability to navigate the enduring complexities of the Syrian conflict, manage resource constraints, and adapt to shifting regional dynamics.

In the end, Syria’s future may hinge less on external actors and more on the resilience and will of its people, who bear the brunt of the ongoing conflict. How these powers balance their ambitions with the realities on the ground will determine whether Syria remains a battleground of competing interests or moves toward a semblance of stability.

Expanded Analysis: The Role of Turkey, the Kurds, and Israel in the Syrian Conflict

In addition to the United States, Russia, and Iran, regional actors such as Turkey, the Kurds, and Israel play pivotal roles in shaping the dynamics of the Syrian conflict. Their objectives and actions interact with those of the global powers, often amplifying or counteracting their strategies. This expanded analysis examines each actor’s role, objectives, and implications.

Turkey’s Strategy: Balancing Security and Regional Influence

Objectives

Turkey’s primary goals in Syria are shaped by security concerns, regional ambitions, and domestic political considerations:

1. Curbing Kurdish Autonomy: Turkey views Kurdish-led groups, particularly the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and its backbone, the YPG (People’s Protection Units), as extensions of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party), a designated terrorist organization. Preventing the establishment of an autonomous Kurdish region along its southern border is Ankara’s top priority.

2. Projecting Regional Power: Turkey seeks to establish itself as a dominant regional player, using its military presence in northern Syria to secure influence over the future of the country.

3. Containing Refugee Flows: With over 3.6 million Syrian refugees already in Turkey, Ankara aims to create a buffer zone in northern Syria to facilitate refugee resettlement and reduce domestic pressures.

Actions

Turkey has conducted multiple military operations in northern Syria, including:

• Operation Euphrates Shield (2016-2017): Targeted ISIS and Kurdish forces.

• Operation Olive Branch (2018): Captured Afrin from Kurdish control.

• Operation Peace Spring (2019): Aimed to establish a “safe zone” by pushing Kurdish forces away from the border.

Implications

• Turkey’s actions have complicated U.S. policy, as the U.S. relies on the SDF to combat ISIS but faces friction with Ankara over its support for Kurdish forces.

• Turkish military operations have destabilized northern Syria, exacerbating humanitarian crises and creating opportunities for extremist groups to resurface.

• Ankara’s alignment with Russia in certain areas (e.g., joint patrols in Idlib) contrasts with its broader opposition to Assad, showcasing its complex positioning in the conflict.

The Kurds: Caught Between Allies and Adversaries

Objectives

The Kurds, particularly through the SDF and YPG, aim to:

1. Establish Autonomy: The Kurds seek to preserve and expand the self-administration they established in northeastern Syria (Rojava) during the conflict.

2. Secure Western Support: They rely heavily on U.S. military and financial support to maintain their fight against ISIS and defend their autonomy from Turkey and Assad.

Challenges

The Kurds face significant obstacles:

• Pressure from Turkey: Turkish military offensives have repeatedly disrupted Kurdish control and displaced populations.

• Dependence on U.S. Support: The Kurds have experienced abrupt shifts in U.S. policy, such as the partial withdrawal of U.S. forces in 2019, leaving them vulnerable to Turkish attacks.

• Negotiations with Assad: Facing existential threats, the Kurds have occasionally engaged in talks with the Assad regime, seeking guarantees for their autonomy in exchange for aligning against Turkey.

Implications

The Kurds are pivotal to the fight against ISIS and play a crucial role in stabilizing northeastern Syria. However:

• Their continued autonomy is unlikely to be tolerated by Turkey, Assad, or even Iran, making their position precarious.

• U.S. wavering on Kurdish support has undermined trust and could push the Kurds toward unfavorable compromises with Assad or Russia.

Israel’s Strategy: Containing Iranian Influence

Objectives

Israel’s involvement in Syria is driven by its overarching security concerns, particularly regarding Iran:

1. Preventing Iranian Entrenchment: Israel seeks to prevent Iran and its proxy, Hezbollah, from establishing a permanent military presence in Syria, which could threaten Israeli territory.

2. Maintaining Strategic Deterrence: Through airstrikes and covert operations, Israel aims to signal its readiness to act against perceived threats.

Actions

• Airstrikes: Israel has conducted hundreds of airstrikes targeting Iranian weapons transfers, military infrastructure, and Hezbollah operatives in Syria.

• Diplomatic Engagement: While officially neutral in the conflict, Israel has maintained communication with Russia to deconflict operations and limit Russian interference in Israeli strikes.

Implications

• Israel’s actions have heightened tensions with Iran and its allies, risking broader regional escalation.

• Israeli strikes complicate Russia’s balancing act in Syria, as Moscow seeks to maintain good relations with both Israel and Iran.

• While Israel avoids direct involvement in the civil war, its operations underscore the broader regional stakes of the conflict.

Interplay of Regional Actors

The actions and objectives of Turkey, the Kurds, and Israel interact in ways that shape the broader conflict:

• Turkey vs. the Kurds: Turkey’s military campaigns directly undermine Kurdish stability, complicating U.S. efforts to use the SDF as a reliable partner against ISIS.

• Turkey and Israel: While both oppose Iranian influence, their strategies are largely independent, with Israel focused on airstrikes and Turkey prioritizing ground operations against the Kurds.

• Kurds and Assad: The Kurds’ negotiations with Assad reflect a pragmatic effort to secure autonomy, but such agreements could embolden the regime and its Iranian allies, complicating Israeli objectives.

Conclusion

The Syrian conflict is shaped by overlapping and competing strategies:

• Turkey seeks to neutralize Kurdish aspirations, secure its borders, and expand its regional influence.

• The Kurds aim to preserve autonomy while navigating shifting alliances with the U.S. and Assad.

• Israel focuses on countering Iran’s presence and safeguarding its security through surgical strikes and deterrence.

These actors operate within the broader framework of U.S., Russian, and Iranian strategies, amplifying the complexity of the conflict. Their interactions suggest that Syria’s future will not be determined solely by global powers but by the interplay of regional dynamics, which continue to evolve unpredictably.

Roll reverse

If the U.S. is indeed shifting toward a position where it must project the image of “building something” in Syria, this represents a strategic pivot with significant implications. Here’s how this might play out and what role Russia and Iran could take in response, possibly resembling insurgency tactics:

1. The U.S. as the “Reluctant Builder”

Even if the U.S. prefers controlled chaos in Syria, it may now feel compelled to project a veneer of governance, stability, or progress in regions it influences. This could include:

• Building Kurdish Autonomy:

Continuing to support the SDF and fostering a semi-autonomous Kurdish region in northeastern Syria, akin to Iraqi Kurdistan, as a counterweight to Assad and Turkey.

• Challenges: Alienates Turkey and requires managing Kurdish-Arab tensions.

• Rebel Stabilization Zones:

Supporting opposition-held areas, such as Idlib, with token aid and governance frameworks to portray these regions as viable alternatives to Assad’s rule.

• Challenges: Risk of Islamist groups dominating and undermining credibility.

• Countering Iranian Influence:

Presenting U.S. military presence and partnerships as a bulwark against Iran’s “malign influence” to justify long-term involvement.

This shift would force the U.S. to engage in symbolic infrastructure projects, governance initiatives, or economic aid to avoid accusations of perpetuating endless destruction.

2. Russia and Iran: The New “Insurgents”?

If the U.S. becomes the de facto stabilizer in parts of Syria, Russia and Iran may adopt asymmetric strategies to undermine American efforts, including tactics traditionally associated with insurgencies:

• Sabotage and Proxy Attacks:

Russia and Iran could use militias, proxies, or even disinformation campaigns to disrupt American-backed governance in Kurdish and rebel-held areas.

• Example: Iranian-backed groups might target U.S. forces or allies with IEDs or rocket attacks, similar to past tactics in Iraq.

• Russian Role: Russia could quietly encourage instability in SDF areas to weaken U.S.-Kurdish relations.

• Weaponizing Refugees and Humanitarian Crises:

By exacerbating conditions in U.S.-influenced zones (e.g., through airstrikes, withholding aid, or population displacement), Russia and Iran could create humanitarian crises that damage U.S. credibility.

• Economic Undermining:

Iran, with its network of loyalists and smuggling routes, could destabilize U.S.-backed regions by flooding them with cheap goods, narcotics, or by disrupting local economies.

• Diplomatic Isolation:

Russia could lead diplomatic efforts to paint U.S. actions as illegitimate occupation while positioning Assad’s regime as the lawful government. Iran would amplify this narrative through its regional alliances.

3. The Risk of American Overreach

Should the U.S. overplay its hand in “building stability,” it risks falling into a quagmire:

• Fragmentation of Alliances:

Turkey would resist any Kurdish autonomy, potentially forcing the U.S. to mediate between two partners with irreconcilable goals. Meanwhile, Islamist groups within the opposition could turn against U.S. efforts at “secular governance.”

• Limited Resources:

American public and political appetite for long-term nation-building is low. The U.S. could find itself stretched too thin to effectively counter Russian and Iranian insurgent-style tactics.

4. Implications for Russia and Iran as “Insurgents”

If Russia and Iran embrace a subversive role, it would mark a shift in strategy but not necessarily a defeat. Their objectives would focus on denial rather than direct confrontation:

• For Russia:

• Preserving Assad’s regime as a geopolitical asset.

• Undermining U.S. legitimacy in Syria while maintaining a foothold in the Mediterranean via Tartus.

• For Iran:

• Ensuring supply routes to Hezbollah remain intact.

• Expanding influence in Shia communities and preparing for long-term resistance.

Both nations would aim to outlast the U.S., betting that American political will erodes faster than their own.

Conclusion: A Game of Shifting Roles

If the U.S. is compelled to “build” in Syria, it inadvertently invites asymmetric responses from Russia and Iran, turning them into insurgent-like actors. This dynamic could escalate into a drawn-out contest, with the U.S. striving to maintain an illusion of stability while its adversaries work to expose cracks in that facade.

The irony is profound: a century after Sykes-Picot, external powers are still drawing new lines and creating new roles for themselves in Syria’s endless theater of conflict. Whether Russia and Iran embrace the insurgent mantle or find alternative strategies, they are unlikely to concede Syria’s future to American interests. Instead, they will aim to exploit the very chaos the U.S. once preferred to manage.

A Palimpsest of Power

The Middle East has always been a battleground, not merely of armies but of narratives, symbols, and structures of meaning. Its history is a cyclical tragedy: every civilization that enters it—whether Macedonian, Roman, Ottoman, or Israeli—comes armed with the conviction that they can succeed where others have failed. Yet, time and again, they are unmade, not only by the resistance of its people or the harshness of its geography but by the very impossibility of imposing coherence on a land that resists permanence.

In the Middle East, history is not a linear progression but a cyclical tragedy, a place where civilizations rise only to fall, where conquerors strut briefly upon the stage before being consumed by the very land they sought to dominate. Unlike the triumphant narratives of other regions, which tell of empires that transformed the world and left lasting legacies, the Middle East offers a more sobering lesson: here, the desert erodes ambition as surely as it erodes stone, and every victor is merely waiting for their defeat.

From a post-structuralist perspective, the Middle East is less a place than a text: a palimpsest of overlapping discourses, where every new empire inscribes its story over the faint traces of what came before resisting traditional narratives of conquest and dominion because it defies the very structures upon which such narratives are built. To rule, to claim sovereignty, is to impose a coherent structure upon the chaos of the real—a chaos that, according to thinkers like Derrida and Foucault, is irreducible. The Middle East, then, is not merely a geographical or political entity but a text—a palimpsest of overlapping, contradictory, and irreconcilable discourses, each vying to be the master narrative yet none able to achieve hegemony for long.

The Macedonians, led by Alexander the Great, entered the region with visions of universal empire. Their Hellenistic cities became centers of learning and culture, monuments to the power of Greek civilization to unify disparate peoples. Yet these cities, like the kingdoms Alexander left behind, were fleeting. They fell to the Parthians and Romans, who themselves found the region impossible to hold without constant effort and compromise.

The Romans could dominate Gaul and subdue Britannia, but their grip on the Middle East was tenuous at best. Their client kings, like Herod, were as much liabilities as assets, and uprisings in Judea left scars that even the legions could not fully heal. They constructed roads, founded cities, and left behind monuments to their power, yet their hold on the region was always tenuous. The uprisings in Judea, the constant wars with the Parthians and later the Sassanids, and the emergence of Christianity as a destabilizing force within their empire all revealed the Middle East as a place where imperial ambitions faltered.

For the Byzantines, heirs to Rome, the region became a constant drain on resources, their endless wars with Persia leaving them vulnerable to the Arab conquests that would redraw the map of the region entirely..

Take the case of the Crusaders. Their arrival was framed within a metaphysical narrative: a divine mission to reclaim the Holy Land, to inscribe upon the landscape the symbols of their faith. Yet their castles, those bastions of permanence, are now ruins—a stark reminder that the land itself cannot be fully colonized by meaning. The Middle East’s resistance is not merely physical or military but semiotic. Its multiplicity of languages, religions, and histories creates a proliferation of signs that cannot be fully subsumed into any singular discourse.

The Ottomans, often lauded as bringers of stability, were not immune to this cycle of futility. While their empire endured longer than most, even they could not fully subdue the fractious tribes and rival factions that made the Middle East a perennial powder keg. Their rule, stretching across centuries, was marked by endless negotiation, rebellion, and compromise. When the Ottomans fell, it was less a dramatic collapse than a slow unraveling, as though the land itself had grown tired of their efforts.

The Ottomans did not conquer the Middle East so much as they managed its contradictions for a time. Yet even their system, which seemed to transcend the binary logic of conqueror and conquered, was eventually undone by the very multiplicity it sought to harness.

And what of the modern era? The Crusaders are perhaps the most apt historical parallel for the State of Israel. The Crusaders, like modern Israel, entered the Middle East with a clear narrative: they came to reclaim the Holy Land, to impose the symbols of their faith upon a region they saw as divinely ordained for their rule. Its narrative of return—a reclamation of historical presence after millennia of exile—is an attempt to impose linearity upon a region defined by cyclical time.

The modern nation-state fares no better. Israel, for instance, constructs its identity through a narrative of return, a reclamation of a historical presence interrupted by exile. This narrative seeks to impose linearity upon a region that operates according to cyclical time, where the ruins of one civilization form the foundations of another, and where the past is never truly past but a persistent, haunting presence. In the post-structuralist sense, Israel’s story is an attempt to stabilize meaning in a text that refuses to be stabilized. Its claim to permanence is not a reality but a performance—a ceaseless reassertion of its presence in a landscape that will ultimately erase it, as it has erased so many before.

The irony is that all players in the Middle East, past and present, share the same ultimate fate. Whether conqueror or conquered, ruler or rebel, the land swallows them all. The Macedonians and Romans, the Ottomans and Crusaders, the modern nation-states carved out by colonial powers—all have found the Middle East to be ungovernable in the long term. Even those who imagine themselves as triumphant—whether through military victories, ideological dominance, or economic control—eventually find their ambitions ground down by the region’s unyielding realities.

This is not because the Middle East is inherently cursed or doomed but because its geography, culture, and history defy the logic of permanence. The land is too strategic to be ignored but too fractious to be held. Its peoples are too diverse to be united under a single banner yet too interconnected to be fully separated. The resources it offers—oil, trade routes, sacred sites—are both a blessing and a curse, inviting exploitation but guaranteeing conflict.

The true lesson of the Middle East is not that it belongs to any one group but that it belongs to no one. Every attempt to dominate it has ended in failure, not because the conquerors were weak but because the land itself resists permanence. To rule the Middle East is to hold sand in one’s hands: the tighter the grip, the faster it slips away.

The Middle East, as post-structuralist thinkers might argue, is a site of différance: an endless deferral of meaning, a space where no single narrative can achieve hegemony. Every attempt to dominate it—whether through military conquest, ideological imposition, or economic exploitation—ultimately founders on the region’s refusal to be fully understood or controlled. Even the resources that make the Middle East strategically vital—its oil, its trade routes, its sacred sites—are both a blessing and a curse. They invite exploitation but guarantee conflict, ensuring that the region remains a battleground long after its conquerors have departed.

In this way, the Middle East serves as a mirror for humanity’s hubris. It reminds us that even the mightiest empires are temporary, that even the most powerful leaders are subject to forces beyond their control. The Middle East is not a land of winners but a land of losers, a graveyard of ambitions where every conqueror must eventually make peace with the inevitable. In this sense, the Middle East is not just the “graveyard of empires” but the graveyard of meaning itself. It exposes the limits of language, power, and history, showing us that all attempts to impose order on the world are ultimately futile. The Middle East cannot be ruled, only endured. And even endurance is fleeting, for the land is patient, and it has all the time in the world to wait.

What post-structuralism reveals is that the Middle East is not a place to be conquered but a text to be read—a text that resists closure, that refuses to yield a single, definitive interpretation. Its history is not a story of progress or decline but of perpetual rewriting, a constant interplay of inscription and erasure. To engage with the Middle East, then, is to confront the instability of meaning itself. It is to recognize that every victory is provisional, every narrative incomplete, and every attempt to impose order doomed to failure. In this light, the Middle East is not just a battleground of armies but a battleground of ideas—a place where the limits of human ambition, understanding, and power are laid bare for all to see

The very idea of “winning” the Middle East is an illusion, a linguistic and cultural construct that collapses under scrutiny. The concept of victory presupposes a finality that the Middle East, in its infinite layers of history and meaning, cannot accommodate. There is no “end” to the story here, only an ongoing process of inscription and erasure, of claims made and unmade, of narratives that rise and fall like the empires that authored them.

This is not to say that the Middle East is uniquely cursed or doomed. Rather, it reveals a fundamental truth about power and permanence. To rule is to impose a structure upon chaos, to pretend that one can hold the shifting sands of history in place. Yet the Middle East, with its multiplicity of languages, religions, and cultures, defies such impositions. It is a reminder that all structures—whether political, cultural, or semiotic—are provisional, that permanence is an illusion, and that even the mightiest empires are temporary.

The Middle East, as post-structuralist thinkers might argue, is a site of différance: an endless deferral of meaning, a space where no single narrative can achieve hegemony. Every attempt to dominate it—whether through military conquest, ideological imposition, or economic exploitation—ultimately founders on the region’s refusal to be fully understood or controlled.

Even the resources that make the Middle East strategically vital—its oil, its trade routes, its sacred sites—are both a blessing and a curse. They invite exploitation but guarantee conflict, ensuring that the region remains a battleground long after its conquerors have departed.

To engage with the Middle East, then, is to confront the instability of meaning itself. It is to recognize that every victory is provisional, every narrative incomplete, and every attempt to impose order doomed to failure. In this light, the Middle East is not just a battleground of armies but a battleground of ideas—a place where the limits of human ambition, understanding, and power are laid bare for all to see.

Disclaimer

Any mention of human rights in this statement applies selectively and is generally contingent upon geopolitical convenience. We would like to clarify that “universal” human rights claims may not universally apply and are subject to selective enforcement. Specific populations, such as the Palestinians, may experience inconsistencies in the application of these rights due to complex and evolving priorities, including but not limited to political alliances, historical narratives, and the definition of “ally.”

While we recognize that humanitarian values are cited as a guiding force, these values are enforced on a case-by-case basis, especially when expedient for Western interests. Please note that condemnation and concern for human rights may be invoked, postponed, or omitted entirely depending on factors like strategic interests, economic considerations, and popular narratives.

In short, “human rights for all” has, in this context, various exclusions, exemptions, and disclaimers—some assembly required.

We further acknowledge that selective concern may result in intensified rhetoric, where one group’s suffering is amplified while another’s is minimized or reframed as “too complex” for unequivocal support. This selective empathy aligns with the latest moral algorithms, which occasionally deprioritize human rights considerations in areas deemed politically sensitive. As a result, the concept of human rights may appear inconsistently applied, but rest assured, this approach remains consistent with long-standing traditions of expedient advocacy.

Moreover, Western audiences are gently reminded that expressions of solidarity and outrage are often tailored for maximal resonance with existing alliances, thus avoiding undue discomfort or confrontation. All public statements are crafted with careful attention to the values of liberty, justice, and freedom—as long as these do not interfere with existing defense contracts, resource access, or the stability of favorable governments.

In closing, please remember that any perceived hypocrisy in this policy is merely an unfortunate byproduct of balancing ethics with pragmatism. Human rights are, as ever, both essential and selectively optional.

See You in 3000 Years

Fire licking at the edges of my retinas, I pound out this screed on a typewriter fueled by equal parts mescaline and Middle Eastern mayhem. The news, a brackish tide of reports, washes over me – the Third Temple, that shimmering mirage in the desert, remains but a pipe dream. Israel, that ambitious experiment in a homeland, seems to be dissolving like Alka-Seltzer in a glass of holy water.

Flickered neon signs casting an apocalyptic glow on Jerusalem’s dusty streets. The air crackled with a tension thicker than the sheesha smoke curling from every hookah bar. This wasn’t the Zion the founding fathers dreamt of, folks. This was a fever dream fueled by religious fervor and geopolitical chess games.

The Third Temple? More like a pipe dream gathering dust in some rabbi’s basement. The dream of a purified Israel, an ethnostate carved from the bleeding heart of the Middle East, had bled out itself. The Great Reset, they called it. Palestine, the ever-present ghost at the feast, finally rose from the ashes, a phoenix with a keffiyeh wrapped around its singed wings.

But hold on, pilgrim! Don’t confuse the dream with the dreamer. The grand ideal of a singular, unified people, that might be gasping its last breaths, but the people themselves – they’re a different story. For centuries, they’ve been tossed and turned across this weary world, these folks who’ve carried a heavy burden for generations. And they ain’t going anywhere. They’ll endure. They’ve faced worse, a whole lot worse. They’ll find their way, they always do. But hold on there, pilgrim! Don’t mistake the nightmare for the dreamer. The sins of the fathers, the blood on European hands from the Spanish Expulsion to the horrors of the 20th century, that stain won’t cannot be washed away on the backs of Palestinians.

The Jews, though, they’ve carried the weight of history on their backs for millennia. They’ve been cast out, persecuted, yet they endure. They’ve seen empires rise and fall, witnessed humanity at its worst, yet they find a way to keep going. This dream of a singular homeland, that might be flickering out, but the Jewish spirit? That’s a fire that won’t be extinguished. They’ll adapt, they’ll persevere, just like they always have.But this grand experiment in building a nation solely on shared ethnicity? That bonfire finally sputtered out of fuel.

This ain’t some hate manifesto, far from it. This is a howl at the absurdity of it all. Here we are, teetering on the precipice of the 21st century, and the same old land squabbles are still playing out like a scratched record.

History, that bastard, has a wicked sense of humor. Remember all that “land flowing with milk and honey” talk? Now the only thing flowing freely was sewage in the neglected infrastructure. Gone were the promises of a tech haven, replaced by a black market bazaar hawking knock-off Iron Dome missiles and bootleg falafel. But here’s the thing, and listen up, you paranoid patriots back home: this ain’t about some blood purity contest. This ain’t about hating Jews. This is about the folly of clinging to ideologies that have curdled past their expiration date.

Maybe, just maybe, 3000 years from now, when the cockroaches are the only ones left reading the graffiti on the crumbling walls of Jerusalem, this whole mess will be a punchline in some cosmic joke. But for now, the stakes are high, the tempers are hotter than a phoenix convention, and the future of that little sliver of land hangs in the balance.

So, as the sands of time shift, and Palestine rises from the ashes of Israel as a Jewish Arab state let this be a message in a bottle. We, the bleary-eyed inhabitants of this lunatic asylum called Earth, better figure this mess out before the whole joint explodes. Because one thing’s for damn sure, folks – this ain’t the last act of this particular drama.

Now, if you’ll excuse me, I have a rendezvous with a bottle of rotgut tequila and a sunrise that looks like it’s been dipped in blood. So, as I sign off, headed for parts unknown with a heart full of disillusionment, remember this: the only Promised Land worth searching for is the one built on mutual respect and shared humanity. See you all in 3000 years, when hopefully, we’ll have learned a thing or two from the ashes of this one. This story’s a long way from over, and who knows what madness the next 3000 years will hold. But hey, that’s the Middle East, baby. A land where prophecies curdle faster than camel milk in the desert sun.

Westworld

Scratching at the surface, man, you see Israel as the iron fist, the puppeteer yanking the US strings. But the Control Panel running Deeper, a roach motel of power where shadows writhe. Israel, is just a fleshy extension, a tentacle of the American Dream dipped in radioactive isotopes – Manifest Destiny dripping with Islamophobia and the sweet, fleshy tang of conquest.

Israel, a flickering neon oasis in the American desert, pulsates with a strange energy. These Brooklyn cowboys, these West Bank settlers, they’re just roaches scuttling across the circuitry, brainwashed by flickering propaganda. Can’t speak the language, passports forged in the fires of delusion. Israel, for them, a Westworld fantasy – “Yeehaw!”, they scream, six-shooters spitting chrome nightmares, “This here’s just like the good ol’ days, wrestlin’ the land from the savages!”

Cut the cord, man, sever the connection, and watch the Israeli psyche unravel like a cheap tapeworm. The delusions of grandeur, the paranoia, it might all start to untangle, a chance, a glimmering possibility for peace in that sun-baked hellhole. But the machine churns on, Westworld forever, a self-perpetuating loop of violence and control. The strings stretch taut, the US at one end, Israel at the other, and the American puppeteer, fat and grinning, his pockets lined with blood money.

These greasy-haired cowboys with delusions of Leviticus, swagger through dusty towns, six-shooters holstered low. They speak a broken Hebrew laced with Brooklyn slang, pronouncements of “Eretz Israel” echoing off tumbleweeds. These are the psychological flotsam, the psychic sewage dredged up by the American Dream and deposited on a desert frontier.

Israel feeds off the dark id of the US. An unacknowledged shadow, a place to indulge in the primal urges of power, land grabs, and good ol’ fashioned “othering.” Cut the wires, sever the connection, and perhaps, just perhaps, the Israeli psyche might start to resemble something approaching sanity. The desert winds could finally carry away the whispers of “chosen people” and the ghosts of ancient battles.

But the control panel hums on. Westworld, a name carved into the sandl, a chrome-plated monument to the conquistador spirit. The prognosis? Grim. Westworld will remain Westworld, a funhouse mirror reflecting the ugliest aspects of American power, played out on a dusty stage far, far away.

Israel, a psychic pressure valve for the American id. Islamophobia, a hissing steam, the need for unfettered power a throbbing erection disguised as democracy. Let the Israelis fend for themselves, cut the umbilical cord of fighter jets and lobbyists. The delusion of grandeur, that shiny chrome exoskeleton, might start to rust, revealing a human vulnerability beneath. Maybe then, peace could rise from the ashes of manifest destiny and settler arrogance.

But the needle gets stuck, the mariachi screams in a feedback loop. Westworld will remain Westworld, a grotesque sideshow under a plastic sky. Israel, a mirage reflecting the distorted desires of a nation in freefall. The colons writhe, a reminder that the past is a disease, ever-present, throbbing just beneath the surface of the American Dream.

Europe, the id in a rumpled trench coat, shoving its primal urges onto the global stage through American muscle and Middle Eastern conflict. Here in Westworld, everyone’s got a role to play, a twisted script directed by the ghosts of empires past.

Europe, they built the sets, erected the barbed wire fences, wrote the racist manifestos that became the theme park brochures. Now, they wash their hands, point at the cowboys and the fanatics, all the while whispering, “Look at the barbarity! How uncivilized!” while clutching their bloody pearls.

But the shadows stretch long, man. The stench of hypocrisy hangs heavy. Antisemitism, that ancient European viper,slithers back across the continent, shedding its skin of “criticism of Israel” and revealing its venomous core. They outsource the hate, then clutch their fainting couches when it spills back across the borders.

This whole damn theme park is built on rotten foundations. Until Europe confronts its own darkness, until they stop projecting their id like a flickering B-movie, there can be no peace. The cycle will continue, a grotesque carousel of violence, spinning ever faster.

Maybe Israel’s a pressure valve for Europe too, a way to vent some of that toxic gas built up over centuries. But it’s a faulty valve, spewing out violence and instability across the whole damn playground. And where’s the superego, the voice of reason in all this? Lost in the funhouse mirrors, no doubt, drowned out by the screams and the gunfire.